



























Link to publication record in King's Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Parrott, M. T. (2014). Bayesian Models, Delusional Beliefs, and Epistemic Possibilities. BRITISH JOURNAL
FOR THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE. 10.1093/bjps/axu036
Citing this paper
Please note that where the full-text provided on King's Research Portal is the Author Accepted Manuscript or Post-Print version this may
differ from the final Published version. If citing, it is advised that you check and use the publisher's definitive version for pagination,
volume/issue, and date of publication details. And where the final published version is provided on the Research Portal, if citing you are
again advised to check the publisher's website for any subsequent corrections.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the Research Portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognize and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
•Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the Research Portal for the purpose of private study or research.
•You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
•You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the Research Portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact librarypure@kcl.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate your claim.
Download date: 18. Feb. 2017
 1 
BAYESIAN MODELS, DELUSIONAL BELIEFS, AND EPISTEMIC POSSIBILITIES  
(Forthcoming: British Journal for the Philosophy of Science) 
 
Matthew Parrott 
University of Oxford 
(Non-citable Draft) 
 
Abstract:  The Capgras delusion is a psychiatric condition in which a person believes 
that an imposter has replaced some close friend or relative. Recent theorists have 
appealed to Bayesianism to help explain both why a subject with the Capgras delusion 
adopts this delusional belief and why it persists despite counterevidence. The Bayesian 
approach is useful for addressing these questions; however, the main proposal of this 
essay is that Capgras subjects also have a delusional conception of epistemic possibility, 
more specifically they think more things are possible, given what is known, than non-
delusional subjects do.  I argue that this is a central way in which their thinking departs 
from ordinary cognition and that it cannot be characterized in Bayesian terms. Thus, in 
order to fully understand the cognitive processing involved in the Capgras delusion, we 
must move beyond Bayesianism. 
 
 
Individuals with delusions report believing incredibly strange things that are nothing like 
what the rest of us believe. Because this sort of behaviour strikes most of us as obviously 
irrational, it raises at least two explanatory questions, both of which are at the centre of 
most contemporary discussions of the nature of delusions. First, there is the question of 
why someone adopts a delusional belief in the first place. Why do they believe something 
so obviously false, especially when it is obvious that there is absolutely no evidence in its 
favour? Secondly, there is the question of why, once it has been adopted, the delusional 
belief persists over time despite the presence of abundant counterevidence (Coltheart 
[2007]; Coltheart, et. al. [2011]; Langdon [2013]). In recent years, several leading 
theorists have turned to Bayesian modelling in order to develop answers to these 
questions (cf. Coltheart, et. al. [2010]; McKay [2012]; Davies and Egan [2013]). More 
specifically, they have adopted a Bayesian approach for explaining the Capgras delusion, 
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the belief that one's close friend or family member, often one's spouse, is a qualitatively 
identical imposter. Although theorists have developed these models with specific 
reference to the Capgras delusion, it is commonly thought that a successful model can be 
extended to other monothematic delusions, which, like Capgras, involve subjects who 
have delusional beliefs concerning only a single theme (Coltheart, et. al. [2011]; Davies 
et. al. [2001]).
1
   
Part of the reason Bayesian models looks especially attractive for understanding 
the Capgras delusion is that there is compelling evidence indicating that the delusion is 
generated in response to an anomalous experience (cf. Stone and Young [1997]). The 
entire Bayesian framework is especially effective at modelling how a person ought to 
adjust his or her beliefs in response to experiential evidence, so by applying it to a case of 
irrational belief, like Capgras, we may be able to better understand both why a subject 
undergoing some kind of an anomalous experience adopts the belief that his or her spouse 
is an imposter and why this belief persists despite what looks like obvious 
counterevidence. The Bayesian approach therefore aims to illustrate more clearly in what 
respects the cognitive processes underlying the Capgras delusion are impaired. 
                                                        
1
 This essay will assume that delusions involve beliefs (for arguments, see Bortolotti 
[2010]; Bayne and Pacherie [2004]). As we will see, however, it would be a mistake to 
think that being delusional is equivalent to pathological believing. This essay will also be 
concerned with the Capgras delusion.  However, the main proposal should apply mutatis 
mutandis to monothematic delusions that are structurally similar to Capgras in that their 
etiology also involves an anomalous experience. 
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As we shall see in the first four sections of this essay, using Bayesianism to model 
delusional cognition can indeed be instructive for understanding why someone believes 
that her acquaintance or spouse is an imposter. But, even though this may help us answer 
certain questions about the adoption and persistence of the Capgras delusion, there may 
be important ways in which this delusion is less susceptible to Bayesian modelling. 
Notably, a Bayesian answer to either the adoption or persistence question only makes 
sense if we assume that a Capgras subject considers certain candidate hypotheses to be 
potential explanations for her highly anomalous experiences, including, crucially, the 
hypothesis that her spouse or close friend is really an imposter. However, no matter how 
odd or unusual one's experience might be, it is very unclear why someone would ever 
think this is a candidate for explaining it. Why would the thought that one's spouse is an 
imposter even be considered as a potential explanation for some unusual experience? The 
Bayesian framework cannot help us answer this question.   
The main proposal of this essay will be that subjects with the Capgras delusion 
have an abnormal conception of epistemic possibility. The basic notion of epistemic 
possibility will be clarified in Section 5 but, for now, we can think of it as being 
equivalent to what is possible, given what is known - things incompatible with what is 
known are not epistemic possibilities. For example, I currently think it is epistemically 
possible that my wife is at home, which is to say that, as far as I know, she might be at 
home. However, since I also know my wife was at work one hour ago, I do not think it is 
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epistemically possible that she is in China. Indeed, I think it is false that she might be in 
China.
2
   
In Section 6, I shall claim that Capgras subjects have an unusually broad 
conception of epistemic possibility in that they think certain things are epistemically 
possible that non-delusional subjects do not. In particular, I shall argue that non-
delusional subjects do not think it is epistemically possible for an imposter to have 
replaced their spouse or close friend precisely because this is clearly incompatible with 
many things non-delusional subjects know to be true, including things like 'this is the 
person I married' and 'this person and I went on holiday last year'.
3
  For this reason, a 
non-delusional subject would not even seriously entertain the possibility that an imposter 
has replaced her spouse or friend, even in cases in which they must explain or make sense 
of some highly anomalous empirical data. If this is right, then simply considering a 
plausible explanation to be that one's spouse or friend is an imposter manifests a 
significant departure from ordinary cognition.  This suggests that, in addition to 
modelling how a delusional subject comes to believe a specific hypothesis in the face of 
                                                        
2
 Notice, however, that I may nevertheless think it is logically or metaphysically possible 
that she is in China. These are senses of 'possibility' that are not restricted by a subject's 
background knowledge. In ordinary discourse, there are many contexts in which people 
express their beliefs about epistemic possibilities by saying that certain things 'might' or 
'might not' be the case. (cf. Kratzer [2012]) 
3
 This is not to say that a non-delusional subject thinks it is absolutely impossible for an 
imposter to replace her spouse. However, the set of things that are epistemically possible 
is smaller than the set of absolute or logical possibilities.  
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an unusual experience, if we hope to fully understand the cognitive processes implicated 
in the Capgras delusion, we must explain why a subject considers certain things to be 
potential explanations for her experience and this will require us to move beyond 
Bayesianism. In Section 7, I argue that this conception of delusional cognition has the 
further advantage of allowing us to make sense of why we do not typically regard 
individuals from different cultures as delusional.  
If the proposal of this essay is correct, we will ultimately want to understand what 
leads a delusional subject to develop such an irregular conception of epistemic 
possibility. This is a difficult question, a full discussion of which is beyond the scope of 
this essay.  However, if there is a distinct cognitive impairment responsible for a subject's 
abnormal conception of epistemic possibility, this may appear to present a clear challenge 
to the well-known two-factor framework for explaining monothematic delusions (cf. 
Davies, et. al. [2001]; Coltheart, et. al. [2011]). I shall discuss this potential challenge in 
Section 8 and also briefly comment on two promising approaches for explaining how a 
person develops an irregular conception of epistemic possibility that seem worth further 
exploration.  
  
1 The Simple Bayesian Model 
 
The idea behind Bayesian modelling of belief processing is that a person's existing beliefs 
can be thought of in terms of subjective probabilities or levels of credence that she 
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assigns to various hypotheses.
4
 How a person ought to rationally respond to new evidence 
can then be captured by a function relating her new evidence to the probabilities she 
assigns.  For example, suppose we have the following two hypotheses: 
H1: The mug on my desk contains water  
H2: The mug on my desk contains gin  
 
Let's also assume the probability that the mug has water rather than gin is fairly high: 
P(H1) = 0.9 and P(H2) = 0.1.  This distribution models what Bayesian theorists call my 
prior probabilities, the levels of credence I have in competing hypotheses before 
considering any evidence. Now, suppose I acquire some new evidence by tasting the 
liquid in the mug and suppose further that it has a botanical flavour and slightly burns my 
palate. Call this evidence E. The general Bayesian idea is that, when confronted with E, a 
rational subject's beliefs should be updated by a process of conditionalization such that 
the new probability the subject assigns to each hypothesis is equal to the prior conditional 
probability of that hypothesis given E. According to Bayes's theorem, this can be 
formulated as follows: 
P' (H1) = P(H1).P(E|H1)/P(E) 
P' (H2) = P(H2).P(E|H2)/P(E) 
 
                                                        
4
 All or nothing beliefs may be thought of as the upper and lower limits of probability 
space (0 and 1). The relation between all or nothing beliefs and subjective probabilities 
raises a number of issues that cannot be addressed in this essay (for discussion see 
Christensen [2004] and Sturgeon [2008]).  
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As we can see, the posterior probability (P') of any hypothesis in light of new evidence 
depends on two things; first how probable that hypothesis is before one acquires any 
evidence and, second, how well that hypothesis predicts the evidence, or how likely the 
evidence is given the hypothesis. Thus, in this example, the balance of epistemic reasons 
favours H2 over H1 if either the prior probability of H1 is comparatively low or the 
likelihood of E given H2 is comparatively high. Let's suppose the latter is true, P(E|H2) > 
P(E|H1). Even so, it will be rational to adopt H2 over H1 only if this likelihood ratio 
favours H2 enough to outweigh its comparatively low prior probability. For instance, if 
P(E|H2) = .80, then it will be rational to believe H2 only if P(E|H1) < .08.     
 Notice that this framework offers us a simple way of understanding how a subject 
should ideally adjust her levels of credence when faced with any kind of evidence. Even 
if one's evidence is not itself very probable, Bayesianism delivers a clear verdict on how 
one should respond to it.  So even if someone's experience were highly abnormal or even 
hallucinatory, a Bayesian model would demonstrate the most rational way to adjust one's 
beliefs.  If we apply a Bayesian model to a non-ideal or irrational case, we will therefore 
get a clear mismatch between how an ideally rational subject should adjust her beliefs 
and how an actual subject does adjust her beliefs. In certain cases, this may illustrate the 
ways in which ordinary human beings are less that ideally rational, for instance due to 
various biases (although see Oaksford and Chater [2007]). And, as we shall see in the 
following three sections, if the model is applied to a delusional subject, it can illustrate 
more clearly how someone's belief forming processes may be impaired.   
 
2 Anomalous Evidence and the Capgras Delusion 
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A prominent theory in cognitive neuropsychiatry maintains that the Capgras delusion is 
caused by an abnormal experience. It has been well established that, in non-delusional 
subjects, visual recognition of a familiar face is associated with a response in a person's 
autonomic nervous system. Several years ago, Ellis and Young ([1990]) proposed that in 
the Capgras delusion the autonomic nervous system is disconnected from a subject's 
facial recognition system, such that visually familiar faces do not elicit this response. 
This hypothesis has been confirmed by several experiments (Ellis, et. al. [1997]; Ellis, et. 
al. [2000]; Brighetti, et. al. [2007]) Thus it seems very likely that a lack of autonomic 
response to a familiar face is at least partly responsible for the Capgras delusion.  
It is important to realize that this lack of autonomic response need not itself 
constitute the Capgras subject's anomalous experience. People are not consciously aware 
of their autonomic nervous system and so it would be difficult to see how they could be 
directly aware of a lack of responsiveness in this system (Coltheart [2005]). Nevertheless, 
it is not unreasonable to think the abnormality in the autonomic nervous system could 
generate some kind of irregular conscious experience, perhaps an experience of 
something being different or wrong in some way.
5
  We need not be conscious of the 
internal operations of the autonomic nervous system in order for its outputs to factor in 
our conscious experiences.   
                                                        
5
 Coltheart ([2005]) suggests that this experience might be caused by a prediction error 
signal. For discussion of prediction error signaling, especially as it relates to Bayesian 
modeling see Adams, et al. ([2013]). 
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 Nonetheless, it is evident that an unusual experience of an otherwise familiar face 
would not be a sufficient explanation for the Capgras delusion. Patients who suffer 
damage to ventromedial regions of the frontal cortex also show diminished autonomic 
responsiveness to familiar faces (Tranel, et. al. [1995]) but they do not adopt the belief 
that their close friend or family member is a stranger or imposter. It therefore seems that 
the Capgras subject's belief processing must be impaired in some additional way that a 
ventromedially damaged subject's is not. For this reason, it is widely agreed that more is 
needed to explain why subjects adopt the Capgras delusion.    
 
3 Impaired Reasoning 
 
In recent years, theorists have developed different Bayesian models to explain how 
impaired empirical reasoning in response to an unusual experience could give rise to the 
Capgras delusion (Coltheart, et. al. [2010]; McKay [2012]; Davies and Egan [2013]; for a 
more general discussion see Adams, et. al. [2013] and Fletcher and Frith [2009]). To 
illustrate these models, consider the following two candidate hypotheses: 
Spouse: This person is my spouse. 
Stranger: This person is an imposter.  
 
As we have seen in the simple the Bayesian picture, whether a subject adopts one these 
will depend in part on its prior probability and in part on how well it explains new 
evidence. We have also seen that subjects suffering from the Capgras delusion are 
presented with anomalous data caused by the fact that they have visual experiences of 
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faces without the normal autonomic responses. For our purposes, let's assume that this 
generates a relatively unspecific experience: 
E: There is something odd about this person. 
 
With this assumption in place, we can model the adoption of the Capgras delusion in a 
Bayesian framework. Since we know that the Capgras subject does adopt Stranger, we 
know that the ratio of posterior probabilities favours Stranger over Spouse. This means 
that either the prior probability of Spouse is comparatively low or the likelihood of E 
given Stranger is comparatively high. The former strikes most people as implausible, so 
let's assume the latter is true, P(E|Stranger) > P(E|Spouse). Nevertheless, it would be 
rational to adopt Stranger only if this ratio sufficiently outweighs its comparatively low 
prior probability.   
When it comes to the Capgras delusion, it might seem obvious that subjects assign 
a low prior probability to Stranger.  Indeed, this is the starting point for the Bayesian 
model developed by Coltheart, Menzies, and Sutton ([2010]).  They claim, 'it would seem 
that a subject might give a very low prior probability to the stranger hypothesis Hs and a 
very high prior probability to the wife hypothesis Hw in view of the general 
implausibility of the general plausibility of the second.' ([2010], pp. 277-8) Nevertheless, 
despite the low prior probability of Stranger, Coltheart, Menzies, and Sutton believe that 
'the delusional hypothesis provides a much more convincing explanation of the highly 
unusual data than the nondelusional hypothesis; and this fact swamps the general 
implausibility of the delusional hypothesis.' ([2010], p. 278) They demonstrate this by 
using the following probability distribution: 
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P(Stranger) = 0.01 
P(Spouse) = 0.99 
P(E|Stranger) = 0.999 
P(E|Spouse) = 0.001 
With these values, we can calculate the posterior probabilities as follows: 
P'(Stranger) ~ 0.91 
P'(Spouse) ~ 0.09 
 
Thus, according to Coltheart and his colleagues, the adoption of the Capgras delusion in 
the face of 'highly unusual data' is not irrational. It is in fact roughly 10 times more 
probable given E. Anyone faced with anomalous data like E ought to update her beliefs to 
include Stranger.    
 This does not mean we must think the delusion is a completely rational response 
to E. Rather, Coltheart, Menzies and Sutton go on to argue that their Bayesian model 
illustrates why it is irrational for a subject to maintain her belief in Stranger. According 
to their view, soon after adopting the belief, a Capgras subject is confronted with a lot of 
data that 'should undermine his belief in the stranger hypothesis' ([2010], p. 279).  We 
might suppose this data includes things like friends and clinicians repeatedly telling the 
subject that he sees his wife or the fact that the alleged stranger knows things only his 
wife could know. It is independently plausible to think this set of counterevidence is 
better explained by Spouse than Stranger, P(counterevidence|Spouse > 
P(counterevidence|Stranger). If so, by standard Bayesian reasoning, a rational subject 
should discard Stranger and update her belief system to include Spouse once she 
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becomes aware of the counterevidence. But, the Capgras subject does not do this. We can 
therefore surmise that her belief processing system is impaired at some stage of belief re-
evaluation. How might this happen?  
Coltheart and his colleagues suggest that Capgras subjects do not 'accept the 
evidence of their senses and the testimony of others.' ([2010], p. 281) So, although they 
respond to E in broadly rational way, they respond irrationally to counterevidence.  As 
they describe it, 'it seems as if the new information does not even enter the deluded 
subject's belief system as data that need to be explained.' ([2010], p. 280) If this is right, 
then it suggests some kind of cognitive deficit prohibits subjects from appropriately 
incorporating sensory or testimonial information. Coltheart and his colleagues speculate 
that the deficit is caused by damage to the right frontal lobe, specifically to the lateral 
region of the right frontal cortex. ([2010]; Coltheart [2007])   
 
4 Setting Priors 
Because the model presented by Coltheart and his colleagues rationalizes the adoption of 
Stranger, Ryan McKay ([2012]) complains that it rests on an implausible conception of 
prior probabilities. McKay thinks the hypothesis that one's spouse is really a stranger 
'represents an exceedingly unlikely - almost miraculous - state of affairs.' ([2012], p. 340) 
For this reason, he believes it is far more realistic to assign it a prior probability of 
0.00027. Correspondingly, he thinks a more realistic value for P(Spouse) is 0.99973. But 
if we adopt McKay's values, then when the Capgras subject updates her beliefs in 
response to E (assuming the same values for likelihood used in the previous model), the 
posterior probability of Stranger will be approximately .21, which would be much lower 
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than the posterior probability of Spouse.  Thus, according to McKay's model, adopting 
Stranger is irrational.    
If this is right, however, why does the Capgras subject adopt it? One possibility, 
favoured by McKay, is that the subject's belief forming system is heavily biased toward 
explanatory adequacy. The general idea would be that Capgras subjects strongly favour 
explaining novel experiences at the expense of pre-existing beliefs, rather than balancing 
the demands of explanation with overall belief conservation (cf. Stone and Young 
[1997]). Aimola Davies and Davies describe this bias as a 'tendency towards acceptance 
of a hypothesis that explains a salient piece of evidence. ' ([2009], p. 293) In Bayesian 
terms, an individual who is biased in this way would update her beliefs in a manner 
isometric to the likelihood ratio. Thus, in the face of E a biased subject will behave as if 
P'(Stranger) = P(E|Stranger)/P(E).
6
  She will effectively discount her prior probabilities.    
Interestingly, once the delusional belief is irrationally adopted in the way McKay 
proposes, one might think its persistence looks fairly normal. The reason has to do with 
what McKay seems to think is involved with incorporating a belief into one's belief 
system. For any hypothesis, if a subject fully incorporates it into her belief system, it 
would immediately affect her overall distribution of credence. To incorporate a belief in 
this way just is to adjust other beliefs so as to preserve overall coherence and consistency. 
                                                        
6
 As McKay notes, this is technically a much more sophisticated function that can capture 
all hypotheses under consideration. Since in this example we are assuming there are only 
two hypotheses, we can simplify. The general point is that someone with a bias toward 
explanatory adequacy will update beliefs in a way that mimics the likelihood ratios.  For 
more detailed discussion, see (McKay [2012]).   
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Since this would alter the probabilities one assigns to a wide range of things, evidence 
that may have been very improbable at one time may no longer be; a point nicely stated 
by Davies and Egan: 
 
It is improbable that a trusted friend should assert, concerning a stranger, that she is the 
patient's wife.  But it is not so improbable that a trusted friend should assert, concerning a 
stranger who looks just like the patient's wife and says that she is his wife (an imposter, 
and a good imposter at that), that she is the patient's wife. ([2013], p. 702)  
 
Thus, if McKay's model is accurate, we may not need to appeal to any further cognitive 
impairment to explain why the Capgras delusion persists.  
However, adopting a Bayesian framework does not preclude us from thinking that 
the persistence of one's delusional belief is irrational. Davies and Egan ([2013]) argue 
that McKay's model relies on an implausibly idealized picture of the belief system. They 
claim instead that rather than forming a single unified network, our beliefs are typically 
fragmented or compartmentalized. This is what allows us to critically reflect on beliefs 
without having to acquire new evidence, which is especially useful in cases where beliefs 
are adopted automatically as pre-potent responses to perceptual stimuli (cf. Egan [2008]). 
If my entire web of beliefs were adjusted to cohere with every automatic perceptual 
belief, it would be difficult for me to ever re-evaluate, and subsequently discard, beliefs 
that are caused by visual illusions or hallucinations.
7
  However, by compartmentalizing, a 
subject is able to retain her prior levels of credence so that those may be used to 
                                                        
7
 See Egan ([2008]) for further discussion of vision.  
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reflectively assess automatic responses, which is why we are not stuck with beliefs in 
visual illusions. 
 Along these lines, Davies and Egan think adopting Stranger is a kind of automatic 
pre-potent response to E.  They then argue that, like any belief formed in this way, it is 
immediately compartmentalized (cf. Gilbert [1991]).  As a result, the delusional subject 
retains her prior levels of credence, which she could use to re-evaluate her belief in 
Stranger. However, whereas an epistemically rational subject would thereby reject 
Stranger, in the case of the Capgras delusion, the belief persists. Davies and Egan 
speculate that this is because the subject's belief evaluation system is impaired in some 
way. Upon reflection, the subject is unable to access 'an alternative to the imposter 
hypothesis that provides a better explanation of the patient's anomalous 
experience.'([2013], p. 719)  
What sort of cognitive impairment might prohibit someone from accessing an 
alternative to Stranger?  Davies and Egan offer two suggestions. First, they propose that 
the patient might suffer from impaired working memory or executive function (cf. 
Aimola-Davies and Davies [2009]; Feinberg and Roane [2005]), which may be 
compounded by the fact that delusional subjects do not adequately understand their 
situation. For this reason, plausible hypotheses, such as that a stroke has disconnected the 
face processing system from the autonomic nervous system leading to an unusual 
experience, are not available to them. But it is not clear why someone would need such a 
sophisticated explanation for E.  If the subject retains her prior level of credence in 
Stranger, which the model assumes to be extremely low, wouldn't any alternative be a 
better explanation?  
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Their second suggestion is that a Capgras subject's delusional beliefs have failed 
to be compartmentalized. In that case, the subject's belief in Stranger would irregularly 
become fully integrated with her other beliefs in a way that changes her prior levels of 
credence. However, notice that if there were this sort of compartmentalization failure, 
one would expect the belief in Stranger to be less circumscribed and to have more of a 
widespread effect on the belief system than it appears to in most cases. (cf. Tumulty 
[2011]) In stereotypical cases of the Capgras delusion, we regularly find subjects who fail 
to act on their delusional beliefs and who frequently report that the delusion is 
implausible. (cf. Bortolotti [2010])  
We have now seen three different Bayesian models of the Capgras delusion, each 
of which answers the adoption and persistence questions in a slightly different way. 
These are not exhaustive. We could develop a model of the delusion in some other way, 
perhaps a way in which both adoption and persistence come out looking rational (cf. 
Maher [1988]). Yet, however we develop a model, the general Bayesian approach looks 
like it will be useful for understanding central aspects of the cognitive processes 
implicated in the Capgras delusion.  We need not debate the details of these different 
models any further because they all share a common assumption, which I think is worth 
questioning.  
 
5 Epistemic Modality 
 
In a Bayesian framework, if a subject's prior probabilities are fixed, a model will 
accurately predict how the subject should update her beliefs when confronted with new 
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evidence. But, if we wish to know what specific value of prior probability to assign to a 
hypothesis, the Bayesian framework offers us no assistance.  An important limitation of 
the Bayesian approach is that it gives us a picture only of how a subject should respond to 
new information. It is completely silent on how the subject should assign prior 
probabilities to competing hypotheses before acquiring information.
8
  However, if we 
wish to model either rational or irrational cognitive processes in Bayesian terms, we need 
some reasonable way to determine prior probabilities. When faced with the theoretical 
question of what probability to assign Stranger in our model, it is intuitive to think the 
most rational assignment would be very low. Indeed, as we have just seen, debates 
between Bayesian theorists mostly centre on whether the prior probability is set low 
enough. But what if all of the previously considered models set P(Stranger) too high? 
Indeed, we might reasonably ask why we should assign Stranger any positive degree of 
credence at all.  
Given some new evidence E, one might think a fully rational subject would 
consider any metaphysically possible or perhaps any logically possible hypothesis that 
could explain E.  In some cases, this would make the set of candidate hypotheses infinite, 
but it is not obviously impossible for a person to, in some sense, consider a countable 
infinite set of hypotheses.
9
 Nevertheless, even if this were the best way to think of some 
                                                        
8
 Cf. Easwaran ([2011]). This essay focuses on the sort of Bayesian framework found in 
contemporary discussions of the Capgras delusion. However, similar questions will arise 
for more dynamic models (cf. Weatherson [2007]).   
9
 Suppose I tell you I am thinking of some specific natural number. It might seem most 
rational for you to distribute your levels of credence evenly among the set of natural 
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cases of total ignorance, it is typically more rational for background knowledge to 
constrain the range of viable hypotheses a subject considers. If I know that p is true, it 
would be straightforwardly irrational for me to consider any anything incompatible with 
p as a possible explanation of E by assigning it some positive probability incompatible 
with the credence I have in p (this would violate the standard probability axioms). This is 
true even though the process of considering a range of hypotheses often takes place 
unconsciously. Thus, on the standard picture, a rational person considers only those 
hypotheses that are not ruled out by background knowledge, which is to say only those 
that are epistemic possibilities.
10
  
Epistemic possibilities are those things that are possible given what is known or, 
equivalently, those things that are compatible with what is known.  With respect to 
probability space, it is quite natural to think of knowledge as having a probability equal to 
1. On the resulting view of epistemic modality, which I favour, a proposition is 
epistemically impossible if and only if it should be assigned a probability equal to zero 
given what is known. However, certain epistemologists strongly resist this way of 
                                                                                                                                                                     
numbers. (cf. Williamson [1999]). This does not entail that any computational operation 
on such a set will be tractable, which will likely depend on some further factors (cf. 
Samuels, [2005]). 
10
 Again, this is an idealization in the model. Ordinary subjects may be irrational in 
certain ways by having epistemically incompatible priors, as we saw is possible in the 
previous section's discussion of belief compartmentalization.  If belief formation is 
implemented by non-conscious modular systems, the set of hypotheses a particular 
module considers may include some that are incompatible with those in other systems.   
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thinking about knowledge. They prefer to lower the threshold of probability that a mental 
state must meet in order to count as a state of knowledge. Although I am not sympathetic 
with this approach to epistemology, it may be tempting to someone with sceptical 
tendencies, someone who thinks we are certain of almost nothing but nevertheless know 
quite a bit. Such a person might think that since we count as knowing things despite 
having a level of credence less than 1, almost every hypothesis is an epistemic possibility 
because almost every hypothesis has some positive probability. If one assigns a 
probability of 0.9 to p, then it is reasonable to assign some positive probability to ~p, 
anything less than or equal to 0.1, which might make ~p very improbable, even 
exceptionally so, but not really impossible. Therefore, someone might think that even an 
extremely improbable delusional hypothesis is nonetheless an epistemic possibility as 
long as it has some positive credence. This is a mistake. 
On any view according to which knowledge falls within a range of subjective 
probabilities less than or equal to 1, we should not think of an epistemic impossibility as 
equivalent to a probability of zero. A given hypothesis is epistemically 
impossible/possible only relative to a given body of knowledge. So whether a hypothesis 
~p (or any q that entails ~p) is epistemically impossible will depend on the degree of 
subjective probability one assigns to p. If p has a subjective probability of 0.9, then ~p is 
epistemically impossible if and only if one assigns it subjective probability over 0.1.  
Therefore, having some positive probability value does not automatically make ~p an 
epistemic possibility; rather it depends on whether the specific value is compatible with 
the probability one assigns to p. Strictly speaking, it is the comparative value of the 
subjective probability that one assigns to ~p that is epistemically possible or impossible. 
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In Bayesian terms, considering an epistemically impossible hypothesis just means 
assigning it a credence that is incompatible with what is known. Whereas on the 
traditional picture, this would be any value over zero, on the more relaxed view we are 
considering here the value depends on the threshold one sets for knowledge.  Regardless, 
on either view, a person considers a hypothesis that is epistemically impossible in virtue 
of having a level of credence in it greater than what is permitted by a given body of 
knowledge.  
But whose knowledge is relevant for determining whether or not a hypothesis is 
epistemically possible? It is very natural to think it is only the knowledge of the 
individual considering the hypothesis. So, we might think that H is an epistemic 
possibility for an agent a if and only if H is compatible with everything a knows. It is, 
however, widely agreed among philosophers that epistemic possibility depends on more 
than what any single individual knows. One reason for this is that a person can come to 
learn that she was wrong about H being epistemically possible. This might happen if a 
were to acquire some new information that rules out H.  For example, if I claim that Peter 
might be in Paris for the weekend, but then learn from you that he stayed in the UK, it is 
natural for me to retract my initial assertion. But if what was epistemically possible for 
me before acquiring this information depended only on what I knew, then, at the earlier 
time, my belief and assertion that Peter might be in Paris would have been correct.  It 
would therefore be wrong for me to retract the previous claim.
11
 Since retraction seems 
warranted in these cases, the epistemic possibility of H cannot depend only on what a 
knows.  
                                                        
11
 For extended discussion, see (MacFarlane [2011]; DeRose [1991]; Egan, et. al. [2005].  
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A similar reason that the knowledge base relevant for determining epistemic 
possibilities must include more than what a single person knows is that different people 
disagree about what is epistemically possible. It seems, for instance, that a could believe 
H is epistemically possible and b could disagree or contradict a on the basis of 
information b possesses. However, if the truth of a's belief depends only on what a 
knows, and the truth of b's belief only on what b knows, this would not make sense. H 
would be epistemically possible for a and impossible for b; so their disagreement would 
not be real-they would be talking past each other.
12
  
For these reasons, we should expand the relevant body of background knowledge 
in our analysis of epistemic possibility. The resulting view is typically that epistemic 
possibility is determined by the knowledge of some contextually salient group. Thus, 
Keith DeRose ([1991]) suggests that whether or not H is epistemically possible depends 
on whether any member of a 'relevant community' knows H is false. If they do, H is not a 
genuine epistemic possibility, regardless of what a individually knows. But, in addition to 
what the relevant community actually knows, there are cases in which it looks like the 
community could easily come to learn some information that bears on the question of 
whether H is epistemically possible. To accommodate this intuition, Andy Egan proposes 
that epistemic possibilities depend on what is within the relevant community's epistemic 
reach:  
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 For further discussion of disagreement, see MacFarlane ([2007]).   
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The idea, though, is pretty clear: It might be the case that P is true iff it’s compatible with 
all of the facts that are within some group’s epistemic reach that P, where what it takes to 
be within one’s epistemic reach can vary across contexts.13 ([2007], p. 8) 
 
One question for Egan's proposal is what counts as being within a community's epistemic 
reach. I am currently sitting by a computer and can easily access the Internet. Does this 
extend my epistemic reach to all Internet-accessible facts? It might, but if it does, it is 
hard to see what difference my immediate spatial proximity to the computer makes. In 
many contexts, it would not be that difficult for me to use some technology to access 
information relevant to a particular question. Does all this information constrain what is 
epistemically possible for me? Again, it might, but then the notion of 'epistemic reach' is 
not really doing much work.   
 There are also questions about who counts as a member of the contextually 
relevant group.
14
  Does the group consist of only those people in the same room as a or 
                                                        
13
 DeRose includes a similar clause in his own account of epistemic possibility but 
phrases it in terms of what the contextually salient community 'can come to know' 
([1991], p. 594). Egan's intends for his concept of 'epistemic reach' to do the work of both 
aspects of DeRose's definition.  This is because, according to Egan, both the information 
of the contextually relevant community and what that community can easily come to 
know are within a's epistemic reach.  
14
 This question is discussed at length in (Dowell [2011]).  She argues that the group can 
fixed by a's intentions. This proposal is difficult to reconcile with certain intuitions 
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just those people with whom a intends to be communicating? Or does the relevant group 
include anyone who could listen to a? And why should the group be restricted at all? 
Why not include the background knowledge of absolutely everyone?  
Although these are interesting questions, however we resolve them, it will be true 
that a's epistemic possibilities are fixed by a body of knowledge that includes more than 
what a knows; it will depend on what is known by others.
15
 We can therefore modify our 
analysis in accord with Egan's proposal: 
 
H is an epistemic possibility for an agent a if and only if H is compatible with everything 
that is within the epistemic reach of some group G.  
 
For now, we do not need to settle who to include in G or in what sense information must 
be in G's epistemic reach. G will certainly include anyone in close proximity to a but may 
include more people, some of whom a may not even be aware of.  For our purposes, it 
only matters that the relevant background knowledge includes more than what any single 
person knows.   
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
people have about cases where eavesdroppers are assessing a's claims about epistemic 
possibility (cf. Egan, et. al. [2005]). 
15
 Might this make it too difficult for a to know what is epistemically possible?  I don't 
see why it would. People learn from others, both about what is actually the case and what 
is epistemically possible. Naturally, a will deliberate from whatever she thinks is 
possible, but, in most ordinary cases, a is correct.    
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6 Delusions of Possibility 
 
If the analysis in the previous section is on the right track, Stranger is not an 
epistemically possible hypothesis. The individuals that constitute a typical Capgras 
subject's epistemic community know many things that are incompatible with Stranger.  
For instance, they regularly have thoughts that depend on their knowingly re-identifying 
a delusional subject's spouse, including thoughts like 'it was nice to see the two of you 
[the subject and her spouse] last week,' 'yesterday I saw your [the subject's spouse] keys 
on the dresser,' or 'this person went to the shop with me last Tuesday' (cf. Evans [1982]).   
In order for someone to know things like this, they must be in a position to 
knowledgeably re-identify the Capgras subject's spouse.  And, if the friends and 
colleagues of a Capgras subject do know things that imply that the person claiming to be 
the delusional subject's spouse is in fact the subject's spouse, Stranger is not an 
epistemically possible hypothesis. It is incompatible with what the delusional subject's 
epistemic community knows. Since someone with the Capgras delusion believes 
Stranger, it is clear that she takes it to be an epistemic possibility but she is wrong.  
This suggests that the Capgras subject has an abnormal conception of epistemic 
modality. She envisions the space of epistemic possibility to include more that it actually 
does.
16
 I think we might naturally think of this as a manifestation of delusional cognition, 
                                                        
16
 Might she also envision it to include less than it actually does? Perhaps, but having a 
subjective conception of epistemic space that is a subset of what is actually possible does 
not seem to be delusional. There is a more interesting question of whether the Capgras 
subject takes the space of epistemic possibility to be broader than it actually is quite 
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regardless of whether or not the subject actually comes to believe Stranger.  Simply 
entertaining Stranger as a candidate explanation, assigning it too high of a prior 
probability, demonstrates a subject's thinking is irregular. Indeed a quite common 
reaction to someone with the Capgras delusion is incredulity precisely because it is hard 
to imagine how anyone within our community could seriously entertain the possibility 
that his or her spouse had been replaced by a duplicate, nonetheless actually believe it.  
Compare what would happen to a non-delusional person experiencing E.
 
 Even if 
we suppose such a person would want to explain E in some way, the first step of such an 
process would be to consider a set of epistemically possible hypotheses, each of which 
has some prima facie plausibility as an explanation. Through some cognitive process, one 
would then zero in on the best explanation of E.  What happens in the Capgras case, 
however, is that a delusional subject starts out by considering a different set of candidate 
hypotheses as explanations for E.  So the way the delusional subject generates potential 
explanations is itself manifests a departure from normal cognition.  
                                                                                                                                                                     
generally or whether this irregularity is restricted to the theme of her delusion. I believe 
this is an open empirical question. Since the subject actually believes Stranger, we know 
that she has an abnormal conception of epistemic possibility at least with respect to the 
theme of her delusion, but she may have an abnormally broad conception of epistemic 
space more generally. In that case, we would predict that were she to have other kinds of 
unusual experiences these would also generate delusional beliefs. That is, if the Capgras 
subject has an irregular conception of epistemic possibility generally, the reason her 
delusional thinking is not more widespread is because she does not have a sufficiently 
wide range of anomalous experience.  Until this is tested, we simply do not know.    
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We can even imagine someone who does not actually believe Stranger but 
nevertheless believes it is epistemically possible. In conversations, this person might 
report things like, 'someone might replace my spouse with a duplicate very easily but 
luckily for me this hasn't yet happened.' Or, she might anxiously say, 'every morning, I 
am extremely worried that my spouse might be a duplicate. It has never happened, but it 
might.' This kind of behaviour would, I think, strike us as delusional. What difference 
could it make whether or not a person literally comes to believe the proposition? We 
naturally think something about this way of thinking is wrong simply in virtue of the fact 
that the person seriously considers hypotheses that we would have ruled out.  
Someone may object that even if it is not a genuine epistemic possibility, we 
cannot be certain that ordinary subjects do not consider Stranger; perhaps they do so 
within a modular subsystem rather than consciously. The idea behind this objection is 
that a non-delusional subject might consider epistemic impossibilities like Stranger 
within something like a face-recognition module, and, because that module would be 
unable to access everything the person knows, it would not have access to the knowledge 
that would rule out the epistemic possibility of Stranger. If this line of objection were 
right, a non-delusional subject would, within a face-recognition module, assign a level of 
a probability to Stranger that is incompatible with what is known outside of the modular 
system. However, even if we assume this picture of belief formation as modular, as long 
as the modular system operates in accord with Bayesian principles, any level of 
probability it assigns to Stranger must be compatible with the overall distribution of 
probabilities within that system and there is little reason to think Stranger would be 
epistemically possible relative to information contained within a typical face-recognition 
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module. The sort of knowledge that rules out the epistemic possibility of Stranger, for 
example, information sufficient for re-identifying a person's face ('this person went to the 
shop with me last Tuesday') is plausibly accessible to a face-recognition module (cf. 
Davies and Egan [2013], p. 713).  So even though such a module would not have access 
to more elaborate hypotheses, such as those about brain damage, it would nevertheless 
have sufficient information to rule out the epistemic possibility of Stranger. As we have 
seen, on some pictures, this would not mean that the level of credence assigned to 
Stranger within the module is equal to zero, only that it is sufficiently low to be 
compatible with what is known.
17
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 What if the knowledge accessible to the module fails to make P(Stranger) low enough?  
Suppose the information accessible to a face-recognition module implies that P(Stranger) 
should be less than or equal to .10 but the knowledge of the entire subject (some of which 
is inaccessible) implies that P(Stranger) should be less than or equal to .08 and that the 
module's actual credence in Stranger is .09? This value would be an epistemic 
impossibility, even though it would be permissible relative to the information accessible 
to the module. According to the resulting picture, a non-delusional subject considers an 
epistemically impossible hypothesis (Stranger) at the sub-personal level, even though it 
never turns up in conscious thought. However, there is little reason to think ordinary 
cognition works this way. It is very difficulty to envision a case in which some piece of 
knowledge K is both inaccessible to a cognitive module and also would lower the 
probability one ought to assign to a specific hypothesis like Stranger by only a very small 
amount. So although there is no proof that actual empirical reasoning does not work this 
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A different objection would claim that no one is ever in a position to know that 
some particular individual is not an imposter, so it is not delusional to think she might be.  
However, this line of objection sets the standard for knowledge at an extremely high 
level. It is widely accepted, at least outside of sceptical contexts, that we all know a great 
deal. Importantly, we seem to know a great deal about the individual objects we perceive 
in our immediate environment, including, crucially, enough information to 
knowledgeably re-identify them.
18
 I know for instance that this fruit in front of me is the 
red apple I bought at the store on Monday and that I am drinking from the same mug I 
drank from yesterday. If we have enough evidence to know facts like these, then we 
typically have enough to know that a friend's spouse is not a qualitatively identical 
imposter. The sceptic may wish to resist the idea that other member's of a delusional 
subject's epistemic community know things that are incompatible with the subject's 
spouse being an imposter, but this will mean that they do not know a great deal.  
One might wonder whether it is right to think that a Capgras subject is a member 
of the same epistemic community as those who know things incompatible with Stranger. 
Might we not think instead that a delusional subject has adopted some different set of 
epistemic standards, perhaps because she is having such highly irregular experiences?  
Indeed, reporting a delusion in the face of counterevidence could be seen as a symptom 
                                                                                                                                                                     
way at a subpersonal level (how could there be?), I do not think there is much to be said 
in its favor. 
18
 Indeed there are reasons to think that if we couldn't knowledgably re-identify 
particulars over time that we would not be able to acquire perceptual knowledge of them, 
nor would we be able to act on them (cf. Campbell [2002]) 
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of a kind of withdrawal from one's epistemic community. If the membership of G 
relevant for determining whether Stranger is possible for the Capgras subject did not 
include individuals who know things incompatible with Stranger, then it would be 
premature to conclude that it is an epistemically impossible hypothesis.   
However, it is very hard to see whom to include in G if not the individuals with 
whom a Capgras subject regularly interacts. Most plausibly, discussing the possibility of 
a hypothesis with someone seems sufficient for the interlocutor to become a member of a 
contextually salient G and most Capgras patients regularly engage in conversations with 
family, friends, co-workers, and clinicians, all of whom know things incompatible with 
Stranger. It is therefore highly likely that the background knowledge of these individuals 
determines what is epistemically possible for a Capgras subject.   
 
7 Delusions of Possibility in Different Contexts 
 
One advantage of the proposal that a individual's conception of epistemic possibility can 
be delusional is that it offers the conceptual resources to help us understand why certain 
beliefs can be delusional in some cultures but not in others. Dominic Murphy discusses a 
case of people in the Sudan who believe that trees convey information. As Murphy 
describes them, these people believe that 'trees record conversations, and are privy to the 
plans of witches. You can learn what they know by burning an ebony twig, dipping it in 
water and reading the pattern of ashes in the water.' ([2013], p. 119)  Murphy rightly 
claims that we do not think that individuals belonging to this culture are delusional but he 
also thinks there is a serious risk this cultural exemption is ad hoc.  That is, if someone in 
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our culture were to believe trees conveyed information or recorded conversations in the 
face of counterevidence, we would take them to be delusional. But if our only criteria for 
classifying people as delusional are evidential, it is hard to see how this distinction could 
not be ad hoc.  If someone counts as delusional in virtue of having a belief that is both 
not based on evidence and resistant to counterevidence, then people from different 
cultures should also be classified as delusional.   
I think we can avoid the risk of making ad hoc exceptions by basing them on 
whether or not a subject's conception of epistemic possibility is delusional. In the 
Sudanese culture Murphy discusses, it is presumably compatible with what is known by 
the community for trees to record conversations, which is why the belief that they 
actually do is not obviously delusional--although notice that we could imagine a case in 
which it would be. By contrast, in a very different culture, the notion that trees record 
conversations is incompatible with what the relevant epistemic community knows, so 
either believing it or seriously entertaining the idea appears sufficiently delusional. It is 
right to let cultural considerations affect our assessment of whether an individual's beliefs 
are delusional, but this is because those considerations determine what is a genuine 
epistemic possibility for the individual.
19
   
One worry with this line of thought is that it might seem to make it rather easy for 
entire communities to become delusional.
20
 Suppose that a particular member of the 
Sudanese community, Juliet, becomes exposed to some on-line lectures in biology. She 
                                                        
19
 This is why religious beliefs typically do not strike us as delusional. The epistemic 
possibilities determined by one's community allow for typical religious beliefs.  
20
 Thanks to an anonymous referee for both this objection and the following one. 
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comes to learn that trees do not really convey information, nor do they record 
conversations.  Since Julie has learned this through testimony, we can assume that she 
knows trees don't convey information. Nevertheless, Juliet continues to regularly interact 
with the same people in her community. Sometimes she tells the fellow members of her 
community what she has learned about trees, yet fails to convince them. Because Juliet is 
most plausibly a member of the same G as the rest of her community, her actual 
knowledge that the trees don't convey information or record conversations is 
incompatible with the community's widespread belief that they do. But it seems 
implausible to think that Juliet can make the entire community delusional simply be 
learning about trees.  
This objection illustrates how there is a crucial difference between saying 
someone's conception of epistemic possibility is delusional and saying it is false. Once 
we acknowledge that epistemic possibility depends on more than what any single 
individual knows, it is possible that many people, even an entire community, have a 
mistaken conception of epistemic space. This is true of the Sudanese who continue to 
think trees convey information to them and record conversations even after Juliet has 
learned otherwise. So if we wish to say that these Sudanese individuals are mistaken 
about epistemic possibility, yet not delusional, but also say that a Capgras subject is 
delusional about epistemic possibility, we must mean something more than that the 
Capgras subject's conception of epistemic space is wrong.   
The key difference between someone with a false conception of epistemic 
possibility and someone with a delusional one is that the former's is correctible. In non-
pathological cases, learning information will alter one's conception of what is possible. 
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So a non-delusional individual who mistakenly thinks H is epistemically possible and 
learns some fact q that is incompatible with H or is made aware of some existing 
incompatibility between H and a subset of what she knows will adjust her conception of 
epistemic modality by ceasing to think H is possible. This is not something that tends to 
happen immediately. Juliet's community is not likely to change their beliefs overnight 
simply because Juliet tells them they are wrong. Indeed, given their conception of what is 
epistemically possible, they are likely to discount Juliet's comments about trees. 
However, if these people are not delusional, then persistent exposure to the sort of 
information or evidence that Juliet learned will lead them to change their way of thinking. 
If one is disposed to adjust a false conception of epistemic possibility in light of sufficient 
information, then it is not delusional—it is merely wrong. The Capgras subject is not 
disposed to behave in this way. Even in cases where she reluctantly acknowledges that 
her belief seems extremely odd, her conception of whether or not Stranger is possible 
does not change. It is this irrational persistence of one's conception of epistemic modality 
that is indicative of delusional cognition.
21
 
But what if someone with a mistaken conception of epistemic possibility is just 
extremely stubborn or opinionated? What if Juliet can never convince the members of her 
community that trees don't convey information, no matter how hard she tries?  What if 
they see an abundance of biological evidence and just continue believing that trees 
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 Naturally, if the community's empirical beliefs about trees conveying information to 
them were revised upon confronting counterevidence, it would not be ad hoc to claim 
they were not delusional. In the context of taking Murphy's worry seriously, however, we 
are supposing that the empirical belief persists despite evidence to the contrary.     
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convey information? In that case, I do think it is plausible to describe the members of 
Juliet's community as delusional. Their steadfast resistance no longer seems to be an 
understandable sociological fact, but instead seems like abnormal cognition. Of course 
whether or not this is the appropriate reaction to them will depend crucially on the fact 
the Sudanese are presented with clear evidence by a member of their epistemic 
community, but if they are, then continuing to believe something that is apparently 
epistemically impossible does seem to be delusional. 
Someone might worry that this would make delusional cognition extremely 
widespread.
22
 Suppose, for example, that an overly confident graduate student thinks that 
he is far superior to other students and suppose further that the entire faculty know this is 
wrong.
23
 It follows from this that the graduate student has a mistaken conception of what 
is epistemically possible. Is the student obviously delusional? It seems not. But now 
suppose that the graduate student isn't disposed to change his mind in the face of clear 
counterevidence. Despite what the faculty attempt to show him he continues to believe in 
his own superiority. Is the student's uncorrectable and mistaken conception of what is 
epistemically possible really sufficient for being delusional?  I think it may be and I think 
that any reluctance we might have to categorizing the student as delusional comes from 
                                                        
22
 It is important to keep in mind here that delusions are symptoms and not psychiatric 
conditions. Thus delusions can be present not only in psychosis but also in conditions like 
obsessive-compulsive disorder and dementia (although the lines between diagnostic 
categories are often blurry).  
23
 It is important for the objection that the faculty knows this and does not merely believe 
it. 
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the fact that the content of his belief is not especially bizarre, like the content of the 
Capgras delusion. We can easily imagine a case in which a graduate student would not be 
delusional (though he may be arrogant) in thinking he might be superior because it is not 
incompatible with what is known (perhaps the faculty do not know but merely believe the 
student is not intellectually superior). For this reason, when we are faced with an 
overconfident student, we may be naturally less likely to react with puzzlement and more 
hesitant to intervene than in the case of the Capgras subject. But our more measured 
response does not demonstrate that the student is not actually delusional. Whether they 
are or are not will depend on how they respond to clear and reasonable contradictory 
evidence to the belief that they are intellectual superior.   
The notion of irrational persistence is a familiar theme in discussions of delusions 
and this last objection could be equally raised concerning whether or not a subject's 
strongly held empirical belief is delusional. The worry is that it is not clear at precisely 
what point a stubbornly held belief becomes delusional. For instance, how much evidence 
does someone have to ignore before she counts as delusional?  I think there is probably 
no bright line to be drawn here and that our intuitions will vary between different cases. 
But, especially if the same cognitive processes are implicated in both delusional and 
ordinary cognition, it should not be surprising if there turn out to be borderline cases. 
Nevertheless, I think there will also be clear cases in which the way someone thinks 
about epistemic possibility manifests a delusional pattern of thought, just as there are 
clear cases in which someone's belief is obviously delusional.   
 
8 How Many Factors? 
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In addition to understanding why a delusion is adopted and why it is not discarded in the 
face of counterevidence, it now seems we could ask a third, equally important, question 
about why it is even considered in the first place as a possible explanation.  Raising this 
question might be thought to cause some problems for one of the leading approaches to 
understanding delusions in cognitive neuropsychiatry, the two-factor framework (cf. 
Coltheart, et. al. [2011]; Davies, et. al [2001]). That is we might think that we need a 
distinct cognitive 'factor' or deficit to answer each of these three questions. The central 
methodological assumption of the two-factor approach is not that there are only two 
explanatory questions to be asked about delusional cognition, but the commitment to only 
two cognitive deficits or impairments being needed to answer these questions. Therefore, 
whether or not we need to abandon the two-factor approach will depend on how many 
pathological departures from ordinary cognition are needed to fully explain the Capgras 
delusion (cf. Davies and Egan [2013]).  
The principal claim of this essay has been that the cognitive processes implicated 
in the Capgras delusion involve a delusional sense of epistemic possibility and that this 
contributes to the aetiology of the delusion.
24
 If this is right, it seems that at least two 
factors are needed to adequately answer the adoption question: the occurrence of an 
anomalous experience and whatever causes the subject to assign an irrationally high prior 
probability to Stranger. If these two deficits sufficiently explain why a belief in Stranger 
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 It is worth emphasizing again that this thesis predicts certain results from an 
experiment that tests whether subjects have a delusional conception of epistemic 
modality. It can therefore be empirically disconfirmed.   
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is adopted then the adequacy of the two-factor framework would depend on whether or 
not the persistence of a belief in Stranger is normal.  However, even assuming a 
delusional conception of epistemic possibility, a Capgras subject's prior level of credence 
in Stranger may be significantly lower than her credence in Spouse.  In that case, the 
cognitive processes responsible for adopting Stranger would have to exhibit some kind of 
bias. Following McKay, we might think of this bias as a third-factor, even before we 
consider the persistence question. Obviously if a distinct cognitive impairment were then 
needed to explain the delusion's persistence, it would push us further in the direction of a 
multi-factor account.   
 When it comes to explaining the specific factor that is responsible for a subject 
having a delusional conception of epistemic possibility, I think there are two avenues 
worth exploring. First, delusional subjects might reason according to some kind of non-
standard inference rules. If a Capgras subject were unable to properly deduce the 
consequences of known truths because she used a different set of inference rules, this 
could help explain why she assigns an abnormally high positive prior probability to 
Stranger. However, though there is some evidence that schizophrenics operate with 
different inference rules in certain contexts, there is currently no evidence for thinking a 
Capgras subject exhibits unusual inference patterns (Selesnick and Owen [2012]; Owen, 
Cutting, and David [2007]).  
A more plausible suggestion for why someone develops a delusional conception 
of epistemic modality is that the subject lacks the ability to apply relevant background 
knowledge. The central idea would be that a Capgras would be unable to use what she 
knows to appropriately restrict the range of hypotheses she considers as explanations. 
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Because her thinking about which things are possible is cognitively isolated from 
pertinent information, even if we were to emphasize the implausibility of Stranger, this 
would have little to no effect on her conception of epistemic possibility.  
Using a body of background information to restrict a range of hypotheses requires 
some amount of cognitive resources and we have already seen that Capgras patients 
manifest deficiencies in executive function and working memory (cf. Broome, et. al. 
[2009]; Feinberg and Roane [2005]). These deficits could prohibit someone from 
appropriately applying knowledge that is incompatible with Stranger.  However, there is 
also neurobiological evidence that could help explain why delusional subjects have 
difficulties cognitively restricting epistemic possibilities. It is fairly well documented that 
delusional symptoms are correlated with striatal dopamine elevation. The standard 
account of this is that the aberrant dopamine firing causes inappropriately high saliency 
to be attributed to experiences. (Corlett, et. al. [2007]; Corlett, et. al. [2009]) But a high 
level of striatal dopamine would affect more than experiences. Specifically, it would also 
plausibly cause people to misattribute salience to passing thoughts as well, which could 
contribute to those thoughts seeming to be serious possibilities. According to this 
hypothesis, the surge of dopamine would more or less overwhelm whatever process 
normally inhibits certain thoughts from becoming candidate hypotheses for explanation.  
 Once we explain why Stranger is generated as a candidate hypothesis, we still 
need an account of why it is adopted and why it persists. But we have already seen that 
Bayesian models are helpful for addressing these questions. The limitation of the 
Bayesian approach is that it does not help us understand a subject's abnormal distribution 
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of prior probabilities. But once we understand why a set of candidate hypotheses includes 
Stranger, a Bayesian framework can help us see why Stranger is adopted and maintained.  
It is tempting to think that answering the adoption and persistence questions will 
provide a complete account of a delusion like Capgras. Indeed, from the perspective of 
cognitive neuropsychology, it can be difficult to see what else would need to be 
explained once we have answers to these questions. One aim of this essay has been to 
show that we need to understand delusional patterns of thinking much more broadly and 
this requires expanding the range of our inquiry to address additional questions. It is 
possible that we will discover more than two cognitive factors are implicated in the 
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